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INTRODUCTION
Since the economic cataclysm of the Great Depression, the rehabilitative principle underlying Chapter 11 business reorganizations has
focused on the efficiency of preserving valuable assets by sustaining a
1
business as a going concern rather than liquidation. Despite this traditional model of reorganization, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code
provides distressed companies with two means of selling all or substantially all of their assets: a debtor in possession may undertake an asset
2
sale (1) pursuant to § 363(b)(1) of the Code or (2) within a reorgani3
zation plan under § 1123. Regardless of which statutory approach is

1

See H.R. REP. NO. 95-598, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179
(“The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production
in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets
sold for scrap.”); Chad P. Pugatch et al., The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 39, 45 (2008) (discussing the Chandler Act’s incorporation of
Chapter XI in 1938 for the purpose of providing private businesses with a more advantageous course of action than liquidation).
2
Section 363(b)(1) of the Code permits a trustee “after notice and a hearing” to
sell assets “other than in the ordinary course of business.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2006).
Such sales are often referred to as “out-of-plan sales” because this method bypasses the
confirmation procedure required of sales within reorganization plans. Rachael M. Jackson, Responding to Threats of Bankruptcy Abuse in a Post-Enron World: Trusting the Bankruptcy Judge as the Guardian of Debtor Estates, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 451, 455, 461.
3
Pursuant to § 1123(a)(5)(D), a company may implement a reorganization plan
through the “sale of all or any part of the property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(a)(5)(D). Significantly, because § 1123 asset sales must be completed within the
bounds of a reorganization plan, these sales are subject to Chapter 11’s comprehensive
procedural requirements, which serve to balance the interests of the debtor as well as the
creditors. See Elizabeth B. Rose, Comment, Chocolate, Flowers, and § 363(B): The Opportunity for Sweetheart Deals Without Chapter 11 Protections, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 249, 25657 (2006) (demonstrating how Chapter 11 requirements—including a “disclosure statement,” “creditor approval,” and “good faith”—balance the competing objectives of creditor protection with maximization of the estate’s value).
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pursued, maximization of asset value remains the ultimate goal.
From an efficiency standpoint, there are several reasons why § 363
sales have become more advantageous vehicles than § 1123 reorganization plans for financially distressed companies. After the requisite
5
notice and hearing, these out-of-plan sales provide a more streamlined process because purchase agreements face only court approval,
rather than the more time-consuming confirmation by several classes
6
of creditors. Thus, corporations in need of fast cash undoubtedly
prefer the more expeditious § 363 sale. In addition to the ease of bypassing the rather burdensome creditor voting rights, § 363 sales are
7
more appealing because assets are typically sold free of liabilities, and
8
legally these transactions are final unless marred by bad faith.
Debtors may find § 363 sales increasingly beneficial in the midst of
recessions as a prompt means of generating “the capital needed to
9
fund the company’s reorganization and future survival.” As a result
of the current financial crisis, Chapter 11 filings have inundated bank10
ruptcy courts. Insolvent corporations operating in various industries,
4

See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 420 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[A]
§ 363 sale can often yield the highest price for the assets because of the buyer’s ability
to select liabilities . . . and to purchase a going-concern business.”).
5
Notification must be provided to creditors at least twenty-one days prior to the
hearing. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2). Cf. Rose, supra note 3, at 259-60 (noting that
notification pursuant to § 363 sales is less informative due to the lack of “Chapter 11’s
plan summary and disclosure”).
6
See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 420 (recognizing the beneficial speed of the
process under § 363, under which sales are typically completed within two to three
months (quoting Robert E. Steinberg, The Seven Deadly Sins in § 363 Sales, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., June 2005, at 22)); Jackson, supra note 2, at 461-62 (discussing the time efficiency of avoiding creditor confirmation of a reorganization plan, a process that may
span several years); Micheline Maynard, Automakers’ Swift Cases in Bankruptcy Shock Experts, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2009, at B1 (describing the expeditious forty-five day process of
the General Motors and Chrysler asset sales).
7
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (stating circumstances when property may be sold “free
and clear” of any interest in the property); In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 420 (“‘The
assets are cleansed in that they are sold, with certain limited exceptions, free and clear
of liens, claims and liabilities.’” (quoting Steinberg, supra note 6, at 22)).
8
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (mandating that the “reversal or modification on appeal”
of a sale does not affect its validity if it was carried out in good faith).
9
See Pugatch et al., supra note 1, at 41, 55 (explaining how the economy plays an
integral role in compelling corporations to seek speedy liquidations in the face of
financing shortages and overall declines in value).
10
According to the American Bankruptcy Institute, declarations of bankruptcy by
businesses nationwide spiked from 28,322 in 2007 to 43,456 in 2008 and 60,837 in 2009.
Quarterly Business Bankruptcy Filings for 1994–2010, AM. BANKR. INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Business_Bankruptcy_Filings1&
Template=/TaggedPage/TaggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID=59&ContentID=36301
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11

most notably the automobile industry, have used § 363 sales as the
12
“preferred method of monetizing . . . assets.”
The recent use of
§ 363 sales as a substitute for the more traditional Chapter 11 restructuring of large global companies like General Motors, Chrysler, and
13
Lehman Brothers reflects a dramatic shift in the bankruptcy arena.
This trend has crystallized the idea that traditional restructurings
through reorganization plans may have become a method of the past.
Today, the scope of § 363 has even grown to include the sale of whole
14
companies. The benefits of this tactic, however, do not come without significant costs.
Although this strategy is arguably more efficient than participating
in an in-plan liquidation, § 363 sales have increasingly become more
controversial and vulnerable to abuse. Under the current system,
speed and ease beget inconsistency and a lack of transparency that
jeopardize the soundness of these deals as well as the interests of cred15
itors. Debtor companies pursuing the sale of assets under § 363(b)
(follow “Quarterly Business Bankruptcy Filings for 1994–2010” hyperlink) (last visted
Jan. 15, 2011). See also Eric Morath, Business Bankruptcy Filings Increased 7% in October,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2009, at B4 (“On a year-to-year basis, business bankruptcies shot up
24% in October [2009] compared with the same month in 2008. Mr. Williams called
that increase ‘substantial’ and said it is a bad omen for the final months of 2009 and
the first quarter of 2010.”).
11
See, e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding the
sale of substantially all of “Old Chrysler’s” assets to “New Chrysler” as “[c]onsistent with
an underlying purpose of the Bankruptcy Code—maximizing the value of the bankrupt estate”), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC,
130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009) (approving the sale of substantially all of GM’s assets to a “New GM” using § 363
to “preserve the going concern value; avoid systemic failure; provide continuing employment; . . . and restore consumer confidence”).
12
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 420 (quoting Steinberg, supra note 6, at 22); see
also In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 115 (“In the current economic crisis of 2008–09, § 363(b)
sales have become even more useful and customary.”).
13
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy provides a significant example of how § 363
sales are a common strategy to rescue firms considered to be “too big to fail.” Following the 2008 financial collapse of Lehman Brothers, and almost immediately after
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, its European investment banking and capital markets
operations were sold to Barclays Capital, Inc. See Bay Harbour Mgmt. L.C. v. Lehman
Bros. Holdings Inc. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc.), 415 B.R. 77, 78-79 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (affirming the sale made under § 363).
14
See Rose, supra note 3, at 259 (describing the growing concern that use of § 363 to
liquidate an entire company as an asset was not an action contemplated by Congress);
Maynard, supra note 6 (emphasizing how the GM and Chrysler asset sales “raised the profile of a tactic once used primarily to shed failing plants or unneeded equipment, and
was not considered until a few years ago as a substitute for a complete restructuring”).
15
See Rose, supra note 3, at 250 (“The lack of transparency, the pace of the
process, and the inconsistent treatment by the courts, however, leave the bankruptcy
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obtain the advantage of circumventing the disclosure and equity re16
quirements necessary for the approval of a reorganization plan. Significant differences in the mechanics of these sales—the lack of a dis17
closure statement describing the terms and conditions of the plan,
the limited time and information provided to creditors to review the
18
proposed sale, and an absence of the requirement that the plan be
19
in the best interest of each creditor —create increasing opportunities
20
for unfair dealing under § 363. Thus, prospective purchasers’ weak
21
control over the terms of the transaction, as well as creditors’ lack of
information and input, threatens creditor constituencies, endanger22
ing one of the fundamental aspects of bankruptcy law.

courts and parties in interest vulnerable to unfair dealing, abuse, and sweetheart
deals.” (footnotes omitted)).
16
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 459-65 (comparing the formal requirements of
Chapter 11 plans with asset sales structured outside of such plans).
17
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2006) (“An acceptance or rejection of a plan may not
be solicited after the commencement of the case under this title . . . unless, at the time
of or before such solicitation, there is transmitted to such holder the plan or a summary of the plan, and a written disclosure statement approved, after notice and a hearing, by the court as containing adequate information.”). In comparison, the absence
of this disclosure requirement is substituted with an obligatory notice and hearing under § 363, which are minimal at best. But see Rose, supra note 3, at 260-61 (arguing that
“in traditional areas of increased scrutiny—good faith objections and insider dealing—
notice should minimally include what chapter 11 requires”).
18
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (permitting the trustee to sell the property of the estate after notice and a hearing); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(a)(2) (requiring twenty-one
days notice to all creditors of a proposed sale of property outside of the ordinary
course of business). The decrease in information exchange between the debtor and
creditors and the limited time to raise an objection to a proposed sale prior to a hearing may have the ultimate effect of stifling creditors’ opportunities to prevent a sale.
See Rose, supra note 3, at 262 (explaining that “[p]lan confirmation depends on creditor approval but § 363 sale approval depends on the creditors’ failure” to carry the
burden of proving harm within a relatively short period of time).
19
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (requiring that each creditor “receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest property of a value, as of the effective
date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive or
retain if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7 of this title on such date” as a
prerequisite to court approval of the sale); Jackson, supra note 2, at 459 (noting the
“best interest of the creditors” rule for court approval of reorganization plans).
20
See infra note 72 and accompanying text (noting the disproportionately frequent occurrence of insider dealing with § 363 sales).
21
See Pugatch et al., supra note 1, at 57 (“Sales that occur via a confirmed plan not
only allow the buyer to negotiate the terms of the acquisition, but also allow the buyer
to concurrently assist in shaping the reorganization of the debt structure of the company that it is about to acquire.”).
22
See Rose, supra note 3, at 277 (“The diminution in information and time creates
the potential for unfair dealing with § 363 sales.”). Instances of insider dealing and
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The prominence of § 363 sales, the amplified speed of the
process, and the use of this provision as an alternative to reorganization in unprecedented ways intensify these concerns over potential
abuses. As a result of the shockingly speedy General Motors and
Chrysler sales, where both companies exited from bankruptcy within
23
forty-five days, critics are now duly alarmed that such hasty timelines
will become more common, adversely affecting creditors’ ability to
24
negotiate throughout the process. Furthermore, experts in the field
criticize these recent § 363 sales as “sham sales,” setting the precedent
that a debtor can design “pretend” sales of its key assets to a new entity
set up by the debtor with the objective of avoiding interference by
25
creditors and shareholders. Critics argue that such sales are “artificial” because they do not provide for the proper auction process that
§ 363 calls for—conferring power to one bidder rather than stimulating multi-party bargaining among other interested parties and creditors—and that they have the potential to violate the priority rules in26
stalled by the Code. Regardless of whether these innovative uses of
asset sales are a product of government involvement or a reaction to
27
the unique circumstances of the financial crisis, this precedent has

other potential abuses will be discussed later. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying
text.
23
See Melissa Maleske, Fire Sale: The Chrysler and GM Bankruptcies Highlight the
Dominance and Evolution of 363 Sales, INSIDE COUNSEL, Sept. 2009, at 18, 18 (comparing
the speedy § 363 sales of GM and Chrysler, which lasted forty and forty-two days respectively, to the Chapter 11 reorganization of K-Mart, which lasted from January 2002
through May 2003).
24
See Ashby Jones & Mike Spector, Creditors Cry Foul at Chrysler Precedent, WALL ST.
J., June 13-14, 2009, at B1 (recognizing that the speed of the Chrysler § 363 sale met
with objections by creditors who felt that their lack of participation in the process resulted in “an end run around creditors”); Maynard, supra note 6 (predicting that for
creditors, if debtors follow GM’s and Chrysler’s footsteps, it may “mean less time to
reach a deal”).
25
See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., Why the Chrysler Deal Would Horrify a New Dealer, J. AM.
ENTER. INST., May 8, 2009, http://www.american.com/archive/2009/may-2009/whythe-chrysler-deal-would-horrify-a-new-dealer (equating the controversial New Deal era
equity receiverships—artificial sales of a company to a new entity created by a debtor—
to the use of § 363 in the Chrysler bankruptcy).
26
See id. (describing how the sale of Chrysler to an entity owned by the company’s
employees and Fiat avoids priority rules, by which secured lenders receive less than
lower priority employees and have little power to object to the sale).
27
See Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (noting that use of § 363 sales to the detriment of creditors may be a concern that “likely will dissipate when the financial crisis
ends”); Skeel, supra note 25 (“The government seems to have concluded—as with the
bailouts of Bear Stearns and the American International Group . . .—that the end justifies the means in the current crisis.”).
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now opened the door for smaller, private businesses to use § 363 sales
28
to restructure their entire business.
No matter the cause, the exploitation of § 363 has jeopardized the
soundness of these transactions. That creditors will likely fail to find
sanctuary in bankruptcy courts’ treatment of § 363 sales augments
such concerns. The prevalent standard for court approval of § 363 asset sales, articulated by the Second Circuit in In re Lionel Corp., requires only a motion, a hearing, and a court’s determination that the
29
debtor has a sound business purpose for selling its assets. This test is
designed to strike a balance between judicial discretion and creditor
30
protection.
As this Comment demonstrates, the “sound business purpose” test
is applied inconsistently throughout the nation. Courts approach
these cases using a variety of factors, which produces a large degree of
31
variance in the weight given to each of these considerations. Perhaps a more troubling observation, in light of the escalating and evolving criticism of § 363 sales, is that despite underlying congressional in32
tent and frequent judicial language indicating that good faith is one
such salient factor to be considered, bankruptcy courts typically ex-

28

See, e.g., Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (discussing the use of the Chrysler
precedent to restructure the National Hockey League’s Phoenix Coyotes through a
§ 363 sale).
29
722 F.2d 1063, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1983).
30
See id. at 1069 (“To further the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization, a bankruptcy judge must have substantial freedom to tailor his orders to meet differing circumstances.”). At the same time, the Second Circuit recognized that § 363 does not
grant “the bankruptcy judge carte blanche” to permit the sale, which would be inconsistent with bankruptcy’s goal of protecting the rights of creditors and equity interests,
specifically those of public investors with little bargaining power. Id. at 1069-70.
31
See In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 418-19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (recognizing that “venue selection based on a court’s perceived propensity to approve
§ 363(b) sales . . . ha[s] altered the landscape of Chapter 11 in large cases”). The
court likened forum shopping based on treatment of critical-vendor programs to judicial approval of § 363(b) sales. See id. at 419 n.30 (“Choice of venue based on perception of judicial predisposition has been the subject of discussion in any number of fora
including the popular press. The Wall Street Journal ‘Bankruptcy Blog’ had the following comment . . . : ‘New York judges are . . . willing to go along with critical-vendor
programs, while courts elsewhere, specifically in Chicago, take a different and dimmer
view of them.’” (quoting Creditors Won’t Let Motor Coach Roll Over Them, WALL ST. J.
BANKR. BEAT BLOG (Feb. 3, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/
2009/02/03/creditors-won’t-let-motor-coach-roll-over-them/)).
32
11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (indicating that good faith is a factor to consider in
assessing the validity of a sale authorized under § 363).
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33

amine good faith only as a faint afterthought. With the growing likelihood of abuse of § 363 sales to the detriment of creditors, it is disconcerting that an analysis of good faith in these transactions has been
subordinated to a very liberal application of the business purpose test.
In reaction to the current criticism of large companies’ abuses of
§ 363 sales, the change in the bankruptcy “landscape,” and inconsistent treatment by bankruptcy courts, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Texas in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp. enumerated
thirteen factors to be weighed in determining whether to approve
34
such a transaction. This Comment argues that bankruptcy judges
should follow the Gulf Coast Oil factors as a model. This test, which
modifies previously recognized considerations and adds several new
elements, strikes a sound balance between judicial discretion and adherence to the goals of bankruptcy law while also giving the sound
business purpose test teeth to address recent concerns of abuse. By
providing a more focused legal analysis, which pointedly implies a
good faith requirement within its enumerated factors, this approach
ensures an analysis of good faith as a potential remedy to ameliorate
misuse of the Bankruptcy Code.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview and evaluation of
the sound business purpose test that courts employ in approving § 363
sales. Part II examines the significance of good faith in the bankruptcy context by analyzing the differences between the meaning of good
faith in Chapter 11 reorganizations and in the § 363 approval process.
Additionally, this examination will illustrate the ramifications of ignoring whether a transaction is pursued in good faith. Finally, Part III
analyzes Gulf Coast Oil and the framework that the court articulated.
For the reasons outlined above, this Comment argues that this framework provides a preferable model for evaluating § 363 proposals. Because § 363 sales are so prominent across the nation, courts should
reevaluate the broad discretion that the Bankruptcy Code confers
upon them in order to guarantee that these sales promote creditor
35
protection, an underlying principle of bankruptcy law, by ensuring
that parties enter into these deals in good faith.

33

See Rose, supra note 3, at 250 (warning that “vague good faith standards” weaken
the judicial scrutiny necessary to combat the potential for abuse under § 363).
34
404 B.R. at 422-27.
35
The principles and goals of Chapter 11 include efficiency, maximizing value,
preserving jobs, rehabilitating the business, and providing “[b]enefit [to] other parties
affected by business failure.” Rose, supra note 3, at 254 (citing NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW
COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS (1997)).
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I. THE WORLD OF § 363 SALES: BUSINESS JUDGMENT,
SUB ROSA, AND SWEETHEARTING
The increasing popularity of § 363 sales as a substitute for true reorganizations reflects a growing conflict between the underlying
themes of corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 and the cursory
obligations of debtors under § 363 sales. While the use of these asset
sales promotes efficiency and maximization of value, this strategy also
has the potential to deviate from several goals of bankruptcy law,
namely securing equal distribution among creditors of the same class
36
and rehabilitating the business. As such, the law must somehow reconcile this tension. In hopes of protecting equity and creditor inter37
ests, courts have fashioned flexible evaluations to balance the authority to sell all or substantially all of a debtor’s assets against the potenpotential for abuse when parties evade Chapter 11’s safeguards. This
Part will provide a brief summary of judicial scrutiny of § 363 sales and
the failures of these methods in detecting abuse.
A. The Sound Business Purpose Test
In Lionel, which is presently recognized as the seminal case for the
authorization of asset sales outside of a plan of reorganization, the
Second Circuit addressed this tension through a comprehensive survey of the history behind asset sales in relation to the legislative
38
scheme for corporate reorganizations. In response to the passage of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the court defined the role of the
bankruptcy judge in authorizing § 363 sales and the subsequent stan39
dard the debtor must satisfy to achieve court approval.

36

Gerald F. Munitz, The Bankruptcy Power and Structure of the Bankruptcy Code (describing the several “pillars” of bankruptcy law, including equal distribution amongst
creditors and rehabilitation that maintains a going concern business rather than liquidation), in NUTS AND BOLTS OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY 2009, at 105, 112-13 (PLI
COMMERCIAL LAW & PRACTICE, COURSE HANDBOOK SER. No. A-918).
37
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 474 (“Although the standards of review vary among
the bankruptcy courts, the approaches are characteristically vague and therefore flexible enough to respond to the diverse needs of particular debtors.”).
38
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1066-70 (2d Cir. 1983).
39
The approach the Second Circuit took in resolving these questions is a significant indication of both a legislative and a judicial intent to open access to these sales to
a wide range of debtors. However, the current controversies surrounding asset sales
shed light on the continued expansion of § 363 that allows its use as an alternative to
reorganization for distressed companies, a strategy that the Second Circuit most likely
did not contemplate when deciding Lionel.
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1. Unfettered Discretion
In Lionel, the Second Circuit noted that on its face, the Bankrupt40
cy Reform Act of 1978, unlike earlier bankruptcy laws, does not con41
strain courts in approving the sale of assets. Thus, the Act provides
42
courts broad discretion to authorize such transactions. Accordingly,
the statutory language of the 1978 Act reflects a legislative intent to
craft a more efficient system of judicial involvement. The statute confers upon bankruptcy courts “the authority to intercede, either to
prohibit or impose conditions on sales, thereby protecting the interests in the debtor estate or to facilitating [sic] the efforts of the trustee
43
44
in consummating a sale.” This break from previous bankruptcy law,
which clearly favors a more flexible authorization of asset sales pursuant to § 363 with the purpose of maximizing the value of the estate,
45
reduced judicial constraint.
The Second Circuit took account of certain policy considerations
in interpreting § 363 to grant bankruptcy judges a discretionary role
in the authorization of these transactions. The court acknowledged
that with the best interests of the estate as the ultimate consideration,
the decisionmaker would have to bear in mind that each debtor’s sit46
uation was unique. Each distressed company has obligations to different creditors with varying interests, and thus, the likelihood of maximizing value for one debtor may necessitate a different method or

40

Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codifed as amended in scattered sections of
11 and 28 U.S.C.).
41
See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1067-69 (concluding that strict limitations upon a
court’s authorization of a sale of a debtor’s property under previous statutes, like the
“upon cause shown” standard pursuant to the Chandler Act of 1938, were not present
in the statutory language of the 1978 Act).
42
See id. at 1069 (“Section 363(b) of the Code seems on its face to confer upon the
bankruptcy judge virtually unfettered discretion to authorize the use, sale or lease,
other than in the ordinary course of business, of property of the estate.”).
43
Jackson, supra note 2, at 473 (footnotes omitted). Section 363(e) indicates a
more limited judicial role in approving asset sales since an interested party must first
request the court’s intervention. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2006).
44
See Jackson, supra note 2, at 473 n.112 (noting that § 363 was a “significant
change from [existing] law, which require[d] the affirmative approval of the bankruptcy judge for almost every action” (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. 95595, at 315 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6272)).
45
See id. (observing that § 363 affords judges more freedom either to “facilitate or
frustrate” sales).
46
See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069 (“[T]he bankruptcy machinery should not
straightjacket the bankruptcy judge so as to prevent him from doing what is best for
the estate.”).
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timeline than for another. Therefore, the court affirmed that “[t]o
further the purposes of Chapter 11 reorganization, a bankruptcy
judge must have substantial freedom to tailor his order to meet differ48
ing circumstances.”
At the same time, however, the court refused to interpret the statute to permit judicial approval of these asset sales without some form
of scrutiny. Granting bankruptcy judges “carte blanche” was not an option since that would render the notice and hearing requirements superfluous; interested parties would know nothing about the rationale
49
underlying the court’s decision to authorize a sale. Furthermore,
some standard for granting approval was necessary to assuage the fear
that authorization of these sales would put certain creditors and
stockholders with little bargaining power, even with the Chapter 11
50
safeguards, at even more of a disadvantage. In effectuating the goals
of Chapter 11, including the maximization of enterprise value and
efficiency, a § 363 sale must not impede the rights of creditors and
equity holders by completely circumventing Chapter 11’s safeguards.
The Second Circuit therefore concluded that it was the bankruptcy
judge’s duty to scrutinize these proposals in order to protect these
51
The sound business purpose test emanated out of this
parties.
52
balance between avoiding a judicial “straightjacket” and providing
adequate scrutiny in order to protect the interests of all parties.
2. Business Justification and the Relevant Factors
In Lionel, the Second Circuit reviewed a bankruptcy judge’s authorization of Lionel Corporation’s plan to sell its most valuable asset, an
47

See id. (noting that imposing strict rules upon exercising power to authorize asset sales may prohibit parties from acting quickly, resulting in the wasting away of an
asset’s value); see also In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that “if a favorable business opportunity is presented that is only available if
acted upon quickly,” the court must have the discretion to authorize the sale if it will
maximize value for the estate), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub
nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
48
In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1069.
49
Id.
50
See id. at 1069-70 (noting that allowing § 363(b) to “swallow[] up Chapter 11’s
safeguards” completely could jeopardize the interests of creditors and stockholders,
particularly scattered public investors who were of particular concern in the passage of
the 1978 Act).
51
See id. at 1071 (“[T]here must be some articulate business justification . . . for
using, selling or leasing property out of the ordinary course of business before the
bankruptcy judge may order such disposition under section 363(b).”).
52
Id. at 1069.
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eighty-two percent interest in Dale, a profitable manufacturer of elec53
tronic components. The bankruptcy judge affirmed the sale based
on the Creditors’ Committee’s support for the auction of this stock
despite that there was no potential for a decrease in the asset’s value if
54
the sale occurred in the future as part of the reorganization plan.
Thus, the Second Circuit, in determining whether to affirm the sale’s
authorization, had to resolve the basic conflict between maximizing
the value of Lionel’s asset to fund its plan of reorganization and permitting the debtor to sell its most profitable asset at the expense of the
safeguards provided by Chapter 11.
With this conflict in mind, the court concluded that a judge may
authorize the sale of an asset prior to a plan of reorganization that is
out of the ordinary course of business under § 363 if the debtor has
55
articulated “a good business reason to grant such an application.”
This test has been equated to state corporate law’s “business judgment
rule,” under which “great deference is given to a business in determin56
ing its own best interests.” However, in determining that the “appeasement of major creditors” alone does not constitute a good business reason for judicial approval of a § 363 sale, the Second Circuit
implied that the business justification in the bankruptcy context must
take into account equity and creditor interests, in addition to the
57
business’s interests.
The sound business purpose test that the Second Circuit pro58
nounced, supplemented by the sub rosa doctrine, has become the
53

Id. at 1065-66.
Id.
55
Id. at 1070-71.
56
In re W.A. Mallory Co., 214 B.R. 834, 836 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
57
See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071 (asserting that support by the Creditors’ Committee was “insufficient as a matter of law because it ignores the equity interests required to be weighed and considered under Chapter 11”).
58
As articulated by the Fifth Circuit, the sub rosa doctrine provides that a proposed § 363 sale cannot “gut the bankruptcy estate before reorganization
or . . . change the fundamental nature of the estate’s assets in such a way that limits a
future reorganization plan.” Bergemann v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock &
Wilcox Co.), 250 F.3d 955, 960 (5th Cir. 2001). In theory, the sub rosa doctrine provides an additional method of objecting to a § 363 sale by claiming that the plan sidesteps the protections of Chapter 11 by dictating any future plan of reorganization. See
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700
F.2d 935, 939-40 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a plan to sell assets was sub rosa because
the transaction materially interfered with the scheme of creditor enfranchisement that
would normally proceed under Chapter 11 and, similarly, would control distributions
allocated in a future plan). Opponents of sales still advance this doctrine and assert
that the transaction in question, though masked as a § 363 sale, is truly a reorganiza54
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generally accepted standard by which debtors proposing § 363 sales
are required to establish “a good, sound business justification for conducting the sale before confirmation . . . , that there has been adequate and reasonable notice of the sale, that the sale has been proposed in good faith, and that the purchase price is fair and
59
reasonable.” In finding that pacification of certain creditors was not
a good business justification for approving the sale of Lionel’s most
valuable asset, the court set out relevant factors to consider, including
(1) “the proportionate value of the asset to the estate as a whole,” (2)
“the amount of elapsed time since the filing,” (3) “the likelihood that
a plan of reorganization will be proposed and confirmed in the near
future,” (4) “the effect of the proposed disposition on future plans of
reorganization,” (5) “proceeds to be obtained from the disposition visa-vis any appraisals of the property,” (6) “which of the alternatives of
use, sale or lease the proposal envisions,” and (7) “whether the asset is
60
increasing or decreasing in value.”
These factors directly address the conflict between enabling creditors to vote on the confirmation of a reorganization plan, providing
them with the leverage necessary to negotiate and protect their own
interests, and granting the use of § 363 to liquidate a debtor’s assets.
Moreover, the court designed this standard to guide judges in the use
of their discretion, rather than to provide a stringent list of considera61
tions to be analyzed. Whether the proposed sale constitutes a sub
rosa plan depends on “the likelihood that a plan of reorganization will
tion and so, a means of evading the plan confirmation process. See, e.g., Institutional
Creditors of Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont’l Air Lines, Inc.),
780 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 (5th Cir. 1986) (vacating the district court’s order approving a
§ 363 sale and remanding to determine whether the sale may have denied “creditors
the protection they would receive if the proposals were first raised in the reorganization plan”); Rosenberg Real Estate Equity Fund III v. Air Beds, Inc. (In re Air Beds,
Inc.), 92 B.R. 419, 422 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (concluding “that the bankruptcy court
abused its discretion because the order allowing the distribution of the sale proceeds
allows the debtor to circumvent the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code for the administration of a case under Chapter 11”). But see, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of
Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating L.L.C.), 478 F.3d 452, 466-67 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that a settlement agreement, by which lenders would receive $92.5 million and another $37.5 million would be allocated to a newly organized litigation entity, was not sub rosa because it enhanced the likelihood of confirmation of the plan rather than for the purpose of evading it); In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 49598 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (recognizing that a sale of assets that treats creditors unequally does not amount to a sub rosa plan because regardless of this disparate treatment, it still transforms assets into cash to maximize value of the company).
59
In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 417-18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
60
In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071.
61
Id.
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be proposed and confirmed in the near future” and “the effect of the
62
proposed disposition on future plans of reorganization.” These factors evaluate whether the § 363 sale “has potential to lead toward confirmation of a plan and is not to evade the plan confirmation process”
and thus aid in determining whether the proponent of the transaction
63
has advanced a proper business justification.
The last factor, namely the fluctuation of the asset in question’s
value, has been characterized as the most salient consideration because the history of bankruptcy law indicates that a sale is appropriate
to prevent a depreciating asset from jeopardizing the goal of maximiz64
ing the value of the estate. Analysis of this factor in Lionel—notably
the only factor the Second Circuit’s majority opinion examined besides the inadequacy of the proceeds of the sale—was determinative in
establishing that there was no good business justification for the sale
65
because the common stock to be sold was not deteriorating in value.
In contrast, the court in In re Baldwin United Corp. found that the debtor articulated a sound business justification for selling a partnership
interest constituting forty percent of its assets where the nature of
such interest would, if not sold promptly, only impede reorganization
66
and would lose value as an asset in the long term. Thus, without the
urgent need to sell an asset that is quickly decreasing in value, courts
may conclude that it is in the best interest of the estate to delay the
sale until the confirmation of a reorganization plan in order to maximize the proceeds to be distributed among creditors. Under this test,
judges mold their decisions to the unique circumstances surrounding
each debtor’s case, using the factors to determine how to satisfy the
objectives of bankruptcy law.

62

Id.
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 95-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC,
130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
64
See id. at 94 (reviewing previous requirements that prior to the sale of estate assets, debtors had to establish that the assets were either “perishable” or would deteriorate in value in the absence of prompt action).
65
See In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071-72 (explaining objections to the sale, including
that “the sale was premature because Dale is not a wasting asset . . . [and] there was no
justifiable cause present since Dale, if anything, is improving”).
66
See In re Baldwin United Corp., 43 B.R. 888, 905-06 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984)
(“[T]he fair value of the partnership interest can only be realized by selling it,
and . . . the Ameritrust proposal provides the best opportunity presently available for
realizing that fair value.”).
63
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B. Evaluating the Sound Business Purpose Test
Against the Goals of Chapter 11
Due to the flexible nature of the sound business purpose test,
judges give a range of considerations different weight in deciding
whether to approve § 363 sales, despite a clear pattern of “reoccurring
67
business justifications.” Scrutiny under this test tends to be cursory
and superficial. Courts liberally defer to the debtor’s business judgment without undertaking a comprehensive discussion of the factors
68
enumerated in Lionel. Deference to management serving as debtorin-possession is common because courts view management’s expertise
and relationships within the industry as significant in maximizing the
69
company’s value. Although such expertise is certainly persuasive, the
process is vulnerable to abuse because of the acceleration of an asset
sale under § 363, as well as the debtor’s disproportionate control over
70
the sale due to the absence of creditor confirmation. The current
system of judicial approval of § 363 sales, in particular the deferential
and inconsistent standard applied throughout the nation, has engendered much criticism. In particular, critics charge that it allows unfair
deals to slip through the cracks of the business justification scheme
and, more recently, that it permits large companies to make unprecedented end runs around creditors who are already in disadvantaged
71
bargaining positions.
In theory, the sound business purpose test and sub rosa doctrine
have balanced the disclosure and confirmation requirements of Chapter 11 and the streamlined process under § 363. However, empirical
67

See Rose, supra note 3, at 269 (averring that courts typically approve certain justifications including “[s]ales that allow the debtor to avoid unnecessary administrative
costs, sales where time is of the essence, and sales that preserve the going concern value of the business”).
68
See id. at 268 (“[C]ourts have continued to evaluate plans inconsistently and often rely on Braniff, Lionel, and Continental as a basis for mere factual comparison.”). As a
result of judges’ discretion in authorizing § 363 sales, written opinions often fail to flesh
out all of the relevant factors in relation to the particular circumstances of the case. See,
e.g., In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071-72 (objecting to the sale on the basis of two of the relevant factors without addressing others that may have been pertinent to the decision).
69
See Rose, supra note 3, at 271 (“A consistent theme in the courts’ assessment of
business justification is the debtor’s superior position in liquidation efforts. . . . Deference
to the debtor’s expertise and connections is especially common with complex business
structures and specialized industries.”).
70
See id. at 263 (“[D]isproportionate leverage in an accelerated sale . . . gives the
debtor the opportunity for unfair dealing.”).
71
See id. at 272 (“The lax standards used to evaluate these sales have contributed
to some of the most corrupt and egregious acts by mega-companies in our country’s
history.”).
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evidence indicates that “§ 363 insider dealing occurs with dispropor72
tionate frequency when compared to chapter 11 confirmed plans.”
The participation of the debtor’s management in negotiating asset
sales with prospective purchasers, along with the speed and lack of
73
transparency in this process, leaves room for potential self-dealing
that may go undetected without cautious judicial consideration of
which groups are benefiting from these sales. Such potential for
abuse calls for increased scrutiny at the bankruptcy court level, rather
than later in the appellate process, because § 363(m) requires an appellant either to obtain a stay on the closing of a sale pending appeal or
to allege that the purchaser has undertaken the transaction in bad
74
faith. The limited ability to appeal once a sale has been authorized
therefore increases the potential for abuse, a danger exacerbated where
75
parties typically close sales immediately after receiving court approval.
Despite certain cases in which potential self-dealers have been
76
caught red-handed by bankruptcy courts, classes of creditors and
public investors alike have been held at the mercy of debtors and bidders who have utilized the sound business purpose test to their own
72

Rose, supra note 3, at 277 (citing LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 175
(2005)).
73
See Rose, supra note 3, at 280 (“The debtor’s ability to manipulate the value of
the business is more of a vulnerability in § 363(b) sales because of the lack of transparency and the accelerated speed of the process.”).
74
11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (“The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization . . . of a sale or lease of property does not affect the validity of a sale or
lease . . . to an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith . . . unless
such authorization and such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.”).
75
See Josef S. Athanas, Section 363 Bankruptcy Sales Attacked by Judges and Commentators Just as Economic Conditions Make Them More Important than Ever (“Once Section 363
sales were approved by the bankruptcy court, parties would quickly close the sale.
Upon closing, appeal of the order approving the sale was virtually impossible.”), in
BANKRUPTCY AND RESTRUCTURING CHAPTER 11 STRATEGIES 2009, at 39, 43 (2009); see
also Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of
Procedural Uncertainty on Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543, 571-72 (2011) (noting that the doctrine of equitable mootness may prevent Article III review of bankruptcy court orders if the bankruptcy court does not grant a stay pending appeal).
76
In In re Biderman Indus. U.S.A., Inc., the court was faced with whether to approve
a letter agreement authorizing a leveraged buyout of the debtor by two companies.
203 B.R. 547, 549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997). The CEO of the debtor-in-possession was to
be employed by one of the purchasers. Id. at 549. As a result of this conflict of interest, the court would not authorize the sale without an assessment of the fairness of the
transaction. Id. at 554. Notably, the court did not analyze this potential sale under the
sound business purpose test after there was evidence of potential self-dealing. Some
courts will analyze § 363 sales under several of the relevant factors without taking note
of any potential for self-dealing or manipulation, which, as demonstrated below, can
lead to inconsistency. See infra Section II.B.
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77

personal advantage. In Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp., Enron
Wind Corporation and its domestic subsidiaries filed for bankruptcy
in relation to its parent corporation’s bankruptcy and proceeded to
seek approval of a proposed sale agreement in which General Electric
Co. would purchase substantially all of the corporation’s assets as well
78
as assets of several solvent European subsidiaries. Although conflict
arose over the allocation of cash payment for these assets between the
U.S. and European subsidiaries, the bankruptcy court, without reaching
79
the merits of the case, deferred to Enron Wind’s business judgment.
Review of the preplan sale by the district court illustrates the potential for abuse that results from complete deference to a debtor’s
business judgment. The potential for self-dealing was apparent in this
80
case, yet the bankruptcy court overlooked it. In finding that Enron
Wind was receiving a fair price for its assets, the court superficially
took account of just one of the factors pronounced in Lionel. The
bankruptcy court failed to scrutinize whether the allocation of the
proceeds was fair and reasonable, and thus in the best interests of the
81
creditors. If the bankruptcy court had undertaken a more comprehensive scrutiny of the deal, it would have discovered that because
Enron Corp., the parent corporation, had been the sole entity negotiating the transaction with General Electric Co., Enron may have possessed a special interest in apportioning more of the proceeds to its
European subsidiaries in an effort to redirect the flow of this money,
82
which was now free of claims, to itself. Although the district court
identified the importance of addressing “the possibility that the allo77

See Rose, supra note 3, at 277-78 (describing the authorization of an asset sale by
Polaroid that caused controversy because several members of Polaroid’s management
and other parties involved in the deal personally benefitted by retaining an equity interest in the purchaser’s business while the asset sold was severely underpriced).
78
Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp., 291 B.R. 39, 40-41 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).
79
Id. at 41. Under the proposal, Enron Wind would receive approximately thirtyseven percent of the $325 million cash payment while sixty-three percent would be allotted to its solvent European subsidiaries despite creditor objection to this allocation.
Id. According to this allocation, “monies paid to the European Asset Sellers would
then flow back to Enron Wind—free . . . of further claims by the creditors of its subsidiaries . . . —from whence such funds could flow to the parent Enron Corp. and its creditors.” Id. at 43.
80
Id. at 43.
81
See id. (“[A]lthough the Bankruptcy Court did find that the total compensation
paid . . . was fair and reasonable, it explicitly avoided any analysis of the allocation itself, believing that this was a matter of deference to the parties’ business judgment.”
(citations omitted)).
82
See id. (explaining the need for “meaningful scrutiny” of the allocation of
proceeds to address the possibility of self-dealing).
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cation may have been infected by self-dealing on the part of Enron
83
Corp.” in time to resolve the issue partially in favor of the creditors,
this deference to a debtor’s business judgment in “conclusory fa84
shion” is disconcertingly widespread. With such great interests at
stake, these accelerated sales, characterized by less disclosure and fewer expenses, must not come at the expense of circumventing the goals
of Chapter 11, including those of equal distribution and creditor protection. Recognizing that a sound business judgment must take ac85
count of all interests, not just those of the debtor’s business, broad
deference to the party holding the most control over the transaction
under § 363 certainly increases the likelihood of unfair dealing.
Moreover, recent criticism of the approval of Chrysler’s § 363 sale
has shed light on yet another way in which the sound business purpose test may sidestep creditor protection. In April 2009, Chrysler
LLC and 24 of its subsidiaries (Chrysler) filed for bankruptcy under
86
Chapter 11 after recording a net loss of $16.8 billion in 2008. As re87
quired by Chrysler’s acceptance of $4 billion in TARP financing,
Chrysler pursued a Viability Plan that involved: (1) Chrysler transferring substantially all of its operating assets to New CarCo (New Chrysler), a limited liability company set up by Fiat as an alliance entity, and
(2) assumption of certain liabilities and $2 billion in cash to be paid to
88
Chrysler in exchange for those assets. According to this prenegotiated deal, first-priority secured creditors holding approximately $6.9
billion in claims would receive twenty-nine cents on the dollar in ex89
change for the transfer of their collateral to New Chrysler. Secured
creditors, including certain Indiana funds, advanced one of the major
objections to the proposed preplan sale: that the sale benefited cer-

83

See id. at 42-43 (noting that although the exchange had already been consummated, the cash proceeds could potentially be redistributed to the extent that the
funds had returned to the debtors).
84
Id. at 43.
85
See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1070-71 (2d Cir. 1983) (indicating the importance of considering interests of
public investors in addition to the debtor’s own interests).
86
In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 87-89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 576 F.3d 108
(2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC,
130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
87
Id. at 90.
88
Id. at 92.
89
Id. at 93.
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90

tain unsecured creditors more than those with collateral. As such,
these creditors argued that the sale would incorrectly prioritize those
91
claims in violation of the Code.
Bankruptcy Judge Arthur Gonzalez applied the sound business
purpose test and concluded that Chrysler had asserted a sound business justification for the sale of its assets outside of a reorganization
92
plan. The basis for this determination emanated from the Lionel factors. First, the court found that the sale of substantially all of Chrysler’s assets to Fiat, who had an interest in New Chrysler, was the only
currently viable option because immediate liquidation would result in
93
less value to be distributed amongst creditors. Thus, maximization
of value called for the sale of the whole enterprise, as opposed to pie94
cemeal fire sales of its assets. Second, Judge Gonzalez determined
that prompt action was required to prevent substantial costs from accruing due to the loss of skilled workers and erosion of consumer con95
fidence. Finally, immediate action was necessary to preserve, at minimum, part of the going concern value of the business since
governmental financing of the transaction would be cut off if the sale
did not close quickly and Fiat’s offer would expire if the sale did not
96
close by a certain date. Furthermore, the court rejected one secured
97
creditor’s argument that the sale constituted a bad faith transaction.
90

See id. (asserting that certain secured lenders would receive less value for their
collateral than what such collateral would be worth when later sold to New Chrysler,
while unsecured creditors, like the UAW, would receive more value).
91
See Richard A. Epstein, The Deadly Sins of the Chrysler Bankruptcy, FORBES.COM
(May 12, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/11/chrysler-bankruptcymortgage-opinions-columnists-epstein.html (“[T]he established priorities of creditor
claims outside bankruptcy have been cast aside in this bankruptcy case as the unsecured claims of the union health pension plan have received a better deal than the secured claims of various bond holders, some of which may represent pension plans of
their own.”).
92
See In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. at 96 (asserting that the Fiat transaction was the
only viable option at the time).
93
Id.
94
See id. (“[T]he terms of the Fiat Transaction present an opportunity that the
marketplace alone could not offer, and that certainly exceeds the liquidation value.”).
95
See id. (listing various costs resulting from any “material delay” in resuming production).
96
See id. at 96 (indicating that delay may have “vitiate[d] several vital agreements”
and that various constituents and creditors required and relied on prompt action).
97
See id. at 106-08 (rejecting the assertion that the U.S. Treasury improperly acted
as an “insider” by controlling both debtors and New Chrysler without possessing the
authority to enter into these transactions). Significantly, the Second Circuit affirmed
the conclusion of the lower court and rejected the bad faith argument. See In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 120 (2d Cir. 2009) (concluding that the record did not support
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The court found that the debtors acted in accordance with their fiduciary duty in choosing “the only option available other than piecemeal
98
liquidation” and no evidence of “fraud, collusion or attempts ‘to take
99
grossly unfair advantage of other bidders’ [were] present.”
Furthermore, the court found the allegation that the U.S. Treasury acted
as an “insider” of the debtors unfounded because Chrysler’s assets
were extensively marketed for two years, the government did not act
to preclude other entities from participating or negotiating in the
100
sale, and the Treasury did not control the debtors.
The Second Circuit upheld the Bankruptcy Court’s decision, affirming that an analysis of the Lionel factors provided a good business
101
reason for the § 363 sale of Chrysler. The court noted that the sale
would in no way offend the priority rules of bankruptcy because
“[t]he lien holders’ security interests would attach to all proceeds of
102
the Sale” and, significantly, any new value arising from the operation
of New Chrysler would be derived from new assets, such as new management, that were not previously attached to the secured creditors’
103
The Second Circuit also emphasized the clear presence
collateral.
of the deterioration of the going concern value of Chrysler and the
104
consequent need for a prompt sale of the business.
Although the courts engaged in a thorough analysis of Chrysler’s
business judgment, commentators criticize the courts involved in authorizing this transaction for allowing § 363 sales as substitutes for
reorganization and for denying creditors the right to actively nego105
tiate to enhance their own interests.
The courts made it clear that

a finding that majority lenders were coerced into the sale), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind.
State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
98
In re Chrysler, 405 B.R. at 97.
99
Id. at 106 (quoting Licensing by Paolo, Inc. v. Sinatra (In re Gucci), 126 F.3d
380, 390 (2d Cir. 1997)). However, on petition for writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit “with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.” Chrysler, 130 S. Ct. at 1015.
100
Id. at 107-108.
101
See In re Chrysler, 576 F.3d at 118-19 (agreeing with the “linchpin” of the bankruptcy court’s analysis).
102
Id. at 118.
103
Id. at 119.
104
See id. (“With its revenues sinking, its factories dark, and its massive debts growing, Chrysler fit the paradigm of the melting ice cube.”). In fact, the court pointed to
expert testimony asserting that Chrysler’s going concern value was declining by nearly
$100 million each day. Id.
105
See Skeel, supra note 25 (criticizing the use of § 363 in the Chrysler bankruptcy
as a “sham sale”); cf. Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (“The Obama administration’s plan
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the asset sale was necessary to preserve the going concern value of
Chrysler and that delay of the confirmation process would likely destroy value in the form of both assets and jobs. Lenders, hedge funds,
and other investors, however, may rightfully be concerned that recent
cases similar to Chrysler have established precedent jeopardizing their
106
interests. Although the use of § 363 as a vehicle to salvage the value
of a going concern is arguably an economically efficient alternative
that, in certain cases, ultimately benefits creditors through larger distributions, efficiency should not take precedence over the law. The
Bankruptcy Code calls for measures of creditor protection, as exemplified by the disclosure and creditor approval requirements of reorganization plans, and for this reason, safeguards against self-dealing
and abuse should be incorporated within the Lionel framework. Drastic increases in the use of § 363 sales as a method of reorganization,
changes in the economy that are sure to continue in the aftermath of
the financial crisis, and the potential for abuse under this provision
demand a reevaluation of Lionel’s sound business purpose test. A
more stringent good faith analysis within the sound business purpose
test is a strong step in the direction of ameliorating these concerns.
The next Part will examine the various approaches and the significance of scrutinizing good faith within bankruptcy law.
II. GOOD FAITH IN THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT:
IS BUSINESS JUDGMENT SUFFICIENT?
After gaining an understanding of the fundamental objectives and
policies underlying the authorization of § 363 sales and corporate
reorganizations more generally, it becomes apparent that in the face
of the tensions inherent in these transactions, good faith may be the
cement that holds the bankruptcy structure together. Despite the fact
that courts frequently and troublingly gloss over the issue of good
faith when approving § 363 sales, “[e]very bankruptcy statute since
1898 has incorporated literally, or by judicial interpretation, a standard of good faith for the commencement, prosecution, and confir107
As courts of equity, with the
mation of bankruptcy proceedings.”
for pushing through Chrysler’s restructuring has been criticized by some for going too
quickly, which led to an end run around creditors, who got little say in the process.”).
106
Jones & Spector, supra note 24 (“‘How do these folks make investment decisions
when they’re faced with bankruptcy courts that appear to disregard the rules?’” (quoting Stephen Lerner, Attorney, Ad Hoc Committee of Chrysler Affected Dealers)).
107
Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev.
Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1071 (5th Cir. 1986).
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authority to use tools such as the turnover of assets, bankruptcy
courts employ the good faith standard to ensure that the benefits of
109
filing for bankruptcy are afforded only to parties with “clean hands.”
Furthermore, the good faith requirement balances the competing interests of debtors, creditors, and equity holders. By placing the debtor’s motives in the spotlight, courts attempt to balance the bargaining
positions of the parties and undertake the responsibility of preventing
110
the manipulation of bankruptcy law. For these reasons, a survey of
courts’ definitions of good faith within the bankruptcy context is essential to understanding how a good faith requirement can serve to
reconcile the tension between Chapter 11 reorganizations and § 363
sales in an effort to thwart abuse.
A. Good Faith in Corporate Reorganizations
Although Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly
111
require that petitioners file for bankruptcy in good faith, the courts
have interpreted the statute to include a good faith requirement to
further the central policies of debtor rehabilitation and creditor pro112
Good faith in this context focuses on whether a debtor
tection.
seeks to achieve a purpose “outside the legitimate scope of the bank113
ruptcy laws.” Courts, however, are split over whether subjective bad
faith is sufficient to establish bad faith or whether the good faith stan108

SEC v. U.S. Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940).
In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d at 1072; see also In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200
F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The ‘good faith’ requirement for Chapter 11 petitioners
has strong roots in equity.”).
110
See In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d at 1072 (noting that the good faith requirement “legitimize[s] delays and costs imposed upon parties to a bankruptcy,” “prevents abuse of the bankruptcy process by debtors,” and “protects the jurisdictional integrity of the bankruptcy courts”).
111
Much of the discussion of what constitutes a bad faith filing under Chapter 11
revolves around § 1112(b). This provision requires a court to “convert a case under
this chapter to a case under Chapter 7 or dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever
is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, if the movant establishes cause.” 11
U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1) (2006).
112
See Carlos J. Cuevas, Good Faith and Chapter 11: Standard that Should Be Employed
to Dismiss Bad Faith Chapter 11 Cases, 60 TENN. L. REV. 525, 525-26 (1993) (discussing
how the tension within the case law between debtor rehabilitation and creditor protection has shaped courts’ interpretations of what constitutes good faith in corporate reorganizations).
113
Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Connell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (1st
Cir. 1983) (“[T]here must be some relation . . . between the Chapter 11 plan and the
reorganization-related purposes that the chapter was designed to serve.”).
109
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dard includes both subjective and objective considerations. In light
of the tension between “the need for permitting a debtor sufficient la115
titude to reorganize and the need for creditor protection,” the
courts have leaned toward a flexible standard of good faith, which
coincides with the heavily factual, case-specific inquiries bankruptcy
116
judges typically employ.
Several courts have held that subjective bad faith—a finding that
the debtor endeavored to abuse the bankruptcy system by filing for
117
Chapter 11 protection—is a sufficient reason for dismissal.
Under
this narrow approach, a court will focus on a debtor’s motives for filing and will find bad faith where there is “a pattern of concealment,
evasion and direct violations of the Code or court order which clearly
118
In such cases, debtor behavior
establishes an improper motive.”
such as acting evasively, manipulating assets, or filing primarily to fru119
strate a secured creditor will be enough to establish bad faith, even
120
where there is a likelihood of successful reorganization.
While this interpretation of good faith acts as a strong means of
creditor protection, this approach ignores another fundamental policy behind Chapter 11. By dismissing cases where reorganization is
possible, this tactic fails to give financially distressed companies the
opportunity to continue operations and emerge from bankruptcy as a
121
going concern.
To balance these two policies, other courts have
employed a less rigid standard that takes into account both the debtor’s subjective intentions and “all of the facts and circumstances of
114

See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 528-29 (identifying courts that apply an “objective-subjective test” and those that apply a “subjective good faith test”).
115
Cuevas, supra note 112, at 531.
116
See Rose, supra note 3, at 273-75 (describing the trend away from the narrow,
intent-to-reorganize standard toward a more flexible interpretation that requires a
case-specific inquiry).
117
See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 532-33 (detailing cases in which courts have dismissed Chapter 11 cases on the sole basis of the debtor’s intent to frustrate creditors
and the bankruptcy process in general).
118
First Nat’l Bank of Sioux City v. Kerr (In re Kerr), 908 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir.
1990).
119
See id. (determining that violating court orders, commingling assets, and filing
frivolous motions constituted bad faith and grounds to dismiss the debtor’s petition).
120
See Phoenix Piccadilly, Ltd. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. (In re Phoenix Piccadilly,
Ltd.), 849 F.2d 1393, 1394-95 (11th Cir. 1988) (“The possibility of a successful reorganization cannot transform a bad faith filing into one undertaken in good faith.”).
121
See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 533-34 (“[U]nder the subjective test, once subjective bad faith is established then the prospect of a successful reorganization is irrelevant. Dismissal, under these circumstances, is contrary to the policies of open access
and financial rehabilitation of distressed companies.” (footnote omitted)).
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122

the case.” Courts will evaluate various objective factors to determine
whether a debtor possesses a rehabilitative purpose because, if not,
the “statutory provisions designed to accomplish the reorganization
objective become destructive of the legitimate rights and interests of
123
creditors.” Thus, an analysis of the debtor’s financial condition and
plan to reorganize is considered a significant indication of the debtor’s subjective intent and whether the filing falls within the legitimate
scope of bankruptcy law .
In In re SGL Carbon Corp., a manufacturer and seller of graphite
electrodes facing potential civil antitrust liability filed for protection
under Chapter 11 and made it explicitly known that its primary pur124
pose for filing was protection against the plaintiffs’ demands. In response to the unsecured creditor committee’s motion to dismiss the
petition on grounds of bad faith, the Third Circuit concluded that
SGL Carbon’s filing lacked “a valid reorganizational purpose” and
125
Despite noting that debtors may postherefore dismissed the case.
sess a valid reorganizational purpose based on the concern that pending litigation may severely jeopardize business operations, the Court
held that SGL Carbon had filed prematurely because the company
126
was still financially viable. After examining the objective conditions
surrounding the filing—the realities of the debtor’s financial situation
and the stated purpose for the petition— the court determined that
SGL Carbon improperly intended to use bankruptcy law as a litigation
127
Accordingly, a debtor’s “intended use of chapter 11 prostrategy.

122

In re Adler, 329 B.R. 406, 410 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also In re SGL Carbon
Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 1999) (examining “the totality of facts and circumstances to determine whether they support a finding of good faith”); Little Creek Dev.
Co. v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. (In re Little Creek Dev. Co.), 779 F.2d 1068, 1074
(5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing that a good faith examination requires judges to investigate “‘all the particular facts and circumstances in each case,’” including the debtor’s
financial condition (quoting Meadowbrook Investors’ Grp. v. Thirtieth Place, Inc. (In
re Thirtieth Place, Inc.), 30 B.R. 503, 505 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983))). Cuevas refers to this
standard as the “totality of the circumstances test.” Cuevas, supra note 112, at 534-35.
123
United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Assocs., Ltd. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987); see also In re SGL Carbon, 200
F.3d at 167 (using an assessment of the debtor’s reorganization plan to work backward in
evaluating whether the debtor’s motives included unfair treatment of creditors).
124
In re SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 156-58.
125
Id. at 169.
126
Id. at 164.
127
See id. at 163, 165 (“SGL Carbon has offered no evidence it could not effectively
use [Chapter 11] protections as the prospect of . . . a judgment becomes imminent.”);
see also Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
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128

tections” is a significant element of the good faith requirement,
since it can demonstrate whether “the debtor objectively ha[d] no
reasonable prospect of reorganizing” and whether the debtor subjectively intended the Chapter 11 petition as a means of “harming credi129
tors or abusing the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”
It is important to realize, however, that filing for Chapter 11 in
good faith means more than having a “valid reorganizational purpose.” In In re Laguna Associates, the Sixth Circuit set forth several relevant factors to aid the courts in determining whether the debtor has
filed in bad faith, including when “the debtor has one asset; . . . the
pre-petition conduct of the debtor has been improper; . . . the debtor
has no ongoing business or employees; and . . . the lack of possibility
130
This examination of both subjective and objecof reorganization.”
tive factors, in addition to the ability to reorganize, suggests that
Chapter 11’s good faith requirement is designed to address the underlying goals of the Bankruptcy Code in a comprehensive manner. Bad
faith is not limited to frustration of creditors and other interested par131
ties; it is also concerned with the broader issue of honoring the objectives of bankruptcy law as voiced by Congress. The concept of good
faith within Chapter 11 strikes a balance between the protection of
creditors and debtors alike and, in doing so, aims to protect the integrity of Chapter 11’s scope from manipulation.
B. Good Faith Under § 363
Courts have extended the flexible, case-by-case analysis of good
faith adopted in the corporate reorganization arena to preplan liqui132
dation of assets under § 363. More specifically, one element that the

that a debtor who had financial means to pay restitution judgment to her ex-husband
used the Chapter 11 petition as a litigation tactic in bad faith).
128
Rose, supra note 3, at 273.
129
Cuevas, supra note 112, at 529.
130
Laguna Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (In re Laguna Assocs.
Ltd. P’ship), 30 F.3d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 1994).
131
See Cuevas, supra note 112, at 536 (noting how totality-of-the-circumstances
good faith examinations ensure that the bankruptcy process benefits all parties, including the debtor and creditors, and take into account “the impact of the corporate reorganization case on society”).
132
See, e.g., NMSBPCSLDHB, L.P. v. Integrated Telecom Express, Inc. (In re Integrated Telecom Express, Inc.), 384 F.3d 108, 120 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Yet liquidation
plans, no less than reorganization plans, must serve a valid bankruptcy purpose. . . . [T]hey must either preserve some going concern value . . . or . . . maximiz[e]
the value of the debtor’s estate.”).
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proponents of a § 363 sale are expected to establish is “that the sale
133
has been proposed in good faith.”
The statutory authority for this
good faith requirement stems from provision § 363(m) of the Code,
which states:
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or (c) of this section of a sale or lease of property does not
affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to an entity
that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and
134
such sale or lease were stayed pending appeal.

Consequently, good faith remains significant under § 363 since an
opponent of a sale will retain the ability to appeal an approval of an asset sale only if the opponent raises an objection to the good faith of the
purchaser involved in the transaction or if the sale is stayed, a seemingly difficult pursuit when closings typically occur immediately after judi135
cial approval. Section 363 sales’ expedited process and lesser disclosure requirements make investigation of the purchaser’s behavior vital
in order to protect creditors, equity holders, and debtors from exploitation. Increased potential for abuse threatens creditors’ interests as
well as the debtor’s ability to maximize the value of the estate. Therefore, in theory, efforts to prevent fraud and inequitable deals should
escalate to a new level of import for court approval of § 363 sales.
Where courts have undertaken a specific analysis of good faith in
the context of approving § 363 sales, they focus more on the detection
of collusion and unfair dealing rather than the more general determination of whether a debtor’s purpose for filing bankruptcy com136
ports with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. An analysis of a party’s
status as a good faith purchaser turns on whether the purchaser has
engaged in any fraudulent or collusive conduct including “‘fraud, col133

In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 418 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006) (emphasis added).
135
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
136
See Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc. (In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc.), 788 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 1986) (“‘The requirement that a purchaser
act in good faith . . . speaks to the integrity of his conduct in the course of the sale proceedings.’” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp. 572 F.2d 1195,
1198 (7th Cir. 1978))). With the objective of encouraging bidders to participate in these
auctions, courts seem to be reluctant to set aside sale orders where no inequitable conduct has occurred. Cf. Taylor v. Lake (In re Cada Invs., Inc.), 664 F.2d 1158, 1162 (9th
Cir. 1981) (recognizing that despite a strong interest in finality of sale orders, “[c]ourts
have generally appeared willing to set aside confirmed sales that were ‘tinged with fraud,
error or similar defects which would in equity affect the validity of any private transaction’” (quoting In re Gen. Insecticide Co., 403 F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1968))).
134
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lusion between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an
137
attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders.’”
The
scope of this investigation into the purchaser’s conduct encompasses
the purchaser’s actions throughout the bankruptcy process up through
138
the performance of the sale. Moreover, a court will look both to the
conduct of the purchaser and to the purchaser’s relationship with the
debtor, treating arm’s-length negotiations and a fair and reasonable
139
price for the assets involved as indicia of a good faith purchase.
Despite the articulation of these good faith standards, the potential for unfair dealing and abuse within asset sales consummated
under § 363 increases when courts fail to take a comprehensive look
at the parties involved and the underlying transaction. Although an
inquiry into whether the sale in question was proposed in good faith is
often cited as a component of the sound business purpose test, such
inquiries are often vague and negligible at best, and therefore fail to
140
protect creditors and investors from exposure to collusive behavior.
In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania, Inc. serves as an example. In
that case, the debtor proposed a sale of its businesses to ADC in order
141
to transfer the debtor’s business operations to the purchaser.
Notice of the motion for approval of the purchase agreement did not indicate that Mr. Gwinn, the debtor’s chairman and CEO, was retained
as a consultant of the purchaser, nor that he would be employed by
142
Despite numerous attempts on the
ADC upon the sale’s closing.
137

In re Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d at 1198).
138
See Charles R. Sterbach & Keriann M. Atencio, Why Johnny Can’t Get Paid on His
General Unsecured Claims: A Potpourri of Lingering Abuses in Chapter 11 Cases, 14 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAC. 111, 127 (2005) (noting that a good faith analysis examines the purchaser’s
conduct during “the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, including its conduct leading up to and during the sale itself ”).
139
See In re W.A. Mallory Co., 214 B.R. 834, 837 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Good faith requires the Court to scrutinize the sales to insure that they are arm’s length transactions
and absolutely fair under the circumstances.”).
140
See Rose, supra note 3, at 275 (“Whether it is the inconsistent scrutiny afforded
§ 363 sales or the more aggressive use by debtors, the current standards are not sufficient to shield the bankruptcy system from unfair dealing and abuse.”). An analysis of
the purchase and the underlying relationship between the parties involved may fall
short of an extensive inquiry when bankruptcy judges defer to disingenuous business
justifications. See, e.g., Mission Iowa Wind Co. v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.), 291
B.R. 39, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (asserting that when there was a reasonable basis to believe
that the asset sale had been subject to self-dealing by Enron, the bankruptcy judge
should have engaged in an analysis of the asset allocation rather than simply deferring
to the debtor’s business judgment).
141
In re Abbotts Dairies, 788 F.2d at 144-45.
142
Id. at 145-46.
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part of unsecured creditors and bidders to object to the purchase
agreement on grounds of bad faith—specifically, that no appraisal of
the debtor’s assets had been performed, competitive bidding had
been chilled, and ADC had agreed to pay an inadequate value—the
bankruptcy court approved the purchase agreement and the district
143
court dismissed the opponent’s appeals as moot.
Upon appellate review and after the sale had already closed, the
Third Circuit ruled that the lower courts erred by failing to recognize
144
that “the situation was ripe for collusion and interested dealing.”
The courts would have had reason to question the debtor’s and purchaser’s good faith if the lower courts had taken account of the CEO’s
conflict of interest, the timing of the debtor’s petition, and the ab145
The Third Circuit
sence of any valuation of the assets being sold.
reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the proceeding
to the bankruptcy court for several determinations, including whether
any such collusion between ADC and Abbotts would constitute bad
faith and, if so, whether ADC had paid “value” for the assets it pur146
chased. The bankruptcy court would then have to decide whether it
147
could equitably undo the sale of the assets to ADC.
Thus, the circumstances of Abbotts Dairies demonstrate the need for bankruptcy
courts to engage in an earnest analysis of good faith prior to the closing
of the sale. Without such an investigation, authorizations of sales made
in bad faith may be consummated to the detriment of creditors and
other opponents who then must appeal their objections, an expensive
148
and legally problematic undertaking with no predictable outcome.
For this reason, the Third Circuit clarified that findings of good
faith are not to be implied in a bankruptcy court’s approval of a sale
pursuant to § 363, but rather that a bankruptcy court, when authorizing such sales, is “required to make a finding with respect to the ‘good
149
faith’ of the purchaser.”
Good faith examinations must be per143

Id. at 146-48.
Id. at 149.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 151.
147
Id.
148
Although the Third Circuit discovered bad faith upon appeal, the possibility of
a remedy for opponents to the sale, who had asserted arguments of bad faith beginning at the bankruptcy level, was speculative at best. See id. at 151 (“If the court determines that ADC did not pay ‘value,’ it will then have to determine whether it has the
power to undo the sale to ADC; implicit in this determination is the question whether . . . the sale has become moot under Article III.”).
149
Id. at 149-50.
144
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formed at the bankruptcy court level because the bankruptcy court is
150
best equipped to inquire into the good faith of a sale, and the district court is permitted to make such findings only “in certain very li151
mited circumstances.”
Such prominent instances of bankruptcy courts failing to address
whether a sale has been proposed in good faith reflect the significant
need for more extensive scrutiny of good faith at the bankruptcy lev152
el. Without an explicit investigation into the underlying transaction
and the relationship between the debtor and purchaser, misuse of
§ 363 sales will become more likely, to the detriment of the estate,
creditors, and other interested parties. The good faith requirement
remains essential to the integrity and spirit of the Bankruptcy Code and
thus should not be reduced to investigation at the appellate level after
assets have already been sold and transferred to bad faith purchasers.
III. IN RE GULF COAST OIL CORP.: A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF PREPLAN ASSET SALES
Financially distressed companies are increasingly looking to § 363
for a faster, less burdensome, and cheaper resolution to their financial
ailments. A procedure once customarily used “to shed failing plants
153
or unneeded equipment” as a means of augmenting a successful reorganization plan has been transformed into a one-stop liquidation of
large, publicly traded companies like GM and Chrysler. The last decade has seen “quantum leaps” in the approval of sales under § 363(b)
in corporate bankruptcy cases of varying sizes as a consequence of factors including “active participation in bankruptcy cases by hedge
funds and other non-bank lending entities, and venue selection based
154
on a court’s perceived propensity to approve § 363(b) sales.”
150

See id. (“First, the bankruptcy court, given its greater familiarity with the parties
and proceedings, represents the forum best able to make such a determination in the
first instance.”).
151
Id. at 150. The Third Circuit noted that the purpose of requiring bankruptcy
courts to engage in this scrutiny of asset sales for good faith paralleled the need to do
so in examining a debtor’s reorganization plan. An inquiry into the good faith of the
debtor and, in the § 363 context, the purchaser, is necessary to ensure that the plan or
sale will comport with the principles of the Code, including creditor protection. See id.
at 150 n.5 (“The purpose of requiring such a finding in each situation, however, is
quite similar: it prevents a debtor-in-possession or trustee from effectively abrogating
the creditor protections of Chapter 11.”).
152
See Rose, supra note 3, at 272-73 (discussing the need for meaningful scrutiny of
good faith in the face of an easily manipulated business justification test).
153
Maynard, supra note 6.
154
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. 407, 418-19 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
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However, the advantages of this tactic do not come without controversy. The prominent cases of abuse, as well as the evolving application of § 363 as a tool to carry out complete restructurings, raise
questions concerning the courts’ inconsistent role and whether these
developments call for corresponding reform of the applicable legal
standards governing these sales. Examining the sound business purpose test and the rather lax good faith requirement, it appears that
the process under this provision has become too easy to maneuver at
the expense of the interests at stake in bankruptcy. The Lionel court,
and all courts following that decisive opinion, rejected a literal reading of § 363(b) that would provide debtors with boundless opportuni155
ties to sell their assets outside of a reorganization plan. In recognition that the statutory language of the Code and decades of case law
require some form of constraint to be imposed upon debtors and
156
purchasers entering into these sales, the standard applied must afford creditors and other parties safeguards that will maintain the underlying principles of corporate reorganization. Accordingly, the shift
in the use of § 363 sales must be accompanied by a modification of the
applicable legal standard of court approvals to rebalance the competing interests of debtor rehabilitation and maximization of value with
the fair treatment and protection of creditors and equity holders. As
this Part discusses, the framework the court presented in Gulf Coast Oil
fulfills this need—and does so well within the confines of the Code—
by maintaining judicial discretion and including an analysis of good
faith as interpreted by courts nationwide.
A. A Revised Outlook on Approval of § 363 Sales
1. Background
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently
reassessed the Fifth Circuit’s position on the judicial role in approving
preplan asset sales. The court was confronted with the issue of whether to authorize an asset sale proposed by a debtor (Gulf Coast Oil)
that encompassed several affiliated companies involved in oil and gas

155

See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983).
156
See id. (“[A]nalysis of the statute’s history and over seven decades of case law
convinces us that such a literal reading of section 363(b) would unnecessarily violate
the congressional scheme for corporate reorganizations.”).
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157

exploration and production in southern Texas.
As of 2005, per an
agreement the debtors entered into with Laurus Master Fund, Ltd.
158
(Laurus), Laurus was the debtors’ sole secured creditor. Due to falling oil and gas prices, inadequate cash flow to support a plan of reorganization, and Laurus’s refusal to accept the reorganization plan, the
159
debtors filed a motion to sell all of Gulf Coast Oil’s assets.
The court recognized that over an eight-month period, the debtors had received little interest from purchasers other than Laurus,
160
and thus, there was “little potential for a meaningful auction.”
If
Laurus, as the only viable purchaser, bought all of the debtors’ assets,
then between $200,000 and $300,000 of unsecured claims would not
161
be paid. Although the debtors claimed that members of the class of
creditors that possessed lien rights would be protected under the sale,
since these encumbrances would be transferred to the proceeds of the
sale, the court rejected this assertion as meaningless. After the sale,
162
there would be no proceeds to which the liens could attach. Consequently, because the debtors would retain no assets upon consummation of the sale, the case would either have to be dismissed or converted to a Chapter 7 “no-asset case,” rather than move forward as a
163
reorganization in Chapter 11.
2. A Modified Approach to Authorization of § 363 Sales
On the issue of whether to authorize the proposed sale of all of
the debtors’ assets to its sole secured creditor, the court found it useful to evaluate the boundaries of the sound business purpose test and
164
the sub rosa doctrine.
After examining the legal standards applied
157

In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 410. The companies that filed voluntary petitions for Chapter 11 protection on July 28, 2008, included Gulf Coast Oil Corp., Century Resources, Inc., and New Century Energy Corp. Id. at 410.
158
Id. at 411.
159
See id. at 412-13. The debtors’ reorganization plan was infeasible because their
assets had so dramatically declined in value that Laurus’s secured claim exceeded the
value of the assets. Id. The debtors sought authorization “to sell all of the property of
the estate, including all cash, oil and gas properties, fixtures, equipment, inventory,
and office equipment, free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances.” Id. at 413.
160
Id. at 412-13. More specifically, in the eight months in which the debtors marketed their assets, they failed to receive any firm offers, and the only expressions of interest were inadequate since the prices contemplated were much smaller than the
claim Laurus held. Id. at 411-13.
161
Id. at 412.
162
Id. at 413.
163
Id. at 414.
164
Id. at 415-18.
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by courts in determining motions to approve § 363 sales, the court
shed light on recent developments in bankruptcy and expressed concern that “[t]he concept of debtor reorganization and rehabilitation is
165
Although the court identified the advantages of these
in peril.”
sales, it further recognized that businesses’ growing use of “Chap166
ter 11 merely to sell their assets and divide up the proceeds” has had
167
a significant impact on the potential for improper use of the Code.
Putting aside the growing debate between efficiency and protection of
parties’ interests, the court explained that the continued expansion of
§ 363 sales necessitated legal guidelines that would address these new
168
developments.
In the face of these concerns, the court adopted a framework that
incorporated the sound business purpose test and followed the flexible structure of weighing all the facts and circumstances of a case as
169
implemented by the Lionel court.
However, the court modified its
inquiry to include a determination of “whether safeguards are necessary to protect rights that could be exercised in the context of plan
170
To guide this analysis, the court enumerated thirconfirmation.”
teen factors “that a court can consider in determining whether to approve a § 363(b) sale prior to confirmation of a chapter 11 plan”:
1. “Is there evidence of a need for speed?”
2. “What is the business justification?”
3. “Is the case sufficiently mature to assure due process?”
4. “Is the proposed [asset purchase agreement] sufficiently straightforward to facilitate competitive bids or [i]s the purchaser the only potential interested party?”
5. “Have the assets been aggressively marketed in an active market?”
6. “Are the fiduciaries that control the debtor truly disinterested?”
7. “Does the proposed sale include all of a debtor’s assets and does it
include the ‘crown jewel’?”

165

Id. at 419 (quoting Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is Chapter 11 Bankrupt?,
47 B.C.L. REV. 129, 129 (2005)).
166
Id. at 419 (quoting Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751 (2002)).
167
Id. at 419.
168
See id. at 422 (“It would be very helpful if the Fifth Circuit were to take another
look at the boundaries of § 363(b) sales to provide more guidance to the bankruptcy
courts in the circuit.”).
169
Id. at 423.
170
Id.
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8. “What extraordinary protections does the purchaser want?”
9. “How burdensome would it be to propose the sale as part of confirmation of a [C]hapter 11 plan?”
10. “Who will benefit from the sale?”
11. “Are Special Adequate Protection Measures Necessary and Possible?”
12. “Was the hearing a true adversary presentation? Is the integrity of
the bankruptcy process protected?”
171

13. “Other factors that apply to the case at hand.”

After weighing these considerations, a court “must determine whether
safeguards are necessary to protect rights that could be exercised in
the context of plan confirmation” and, if so, may implement such sa172
Thus, the inquiry the court adopted focuses
feguards accordingly.
judicial deliberation on securing both maximization of value for the
debtor’s estate and minimization of creditors’ exposure to vulnerabilities that the reorganization confirmation process would otherwise
protect. For the purpose of demonstrating how, in light of the evolution of § 363 sales, the test the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Texas advocated builds upon the Lionel framework, this Comment groups the factors into the following categories: efficiency and
the maximization of value, creditor protection and the good faith requirement, and preservation of the integrity of the bankruptcy process.
a. Factors Aimed at Efficiency and the Maximization of Value
The first factor—the “need for speed”—seeks to ascertain whether
an immediate sale is necessary to prevent the asset from deteriorating in
value. This question, like the Lionel court’s assessment of whether “the
173
asset is increasing or decreasing in value,” is aimed at ensuring the
maximization of value of the debtor’s estate. Although “[d]isposition of
perishable assets is the archetype justification for a § 363(b) sale,” the
Gulf Coast Oil court advanced the caveat that judges must take a deeper look into the need to act quickly in the name of value preservation
174
Accordingly,
because not all asset sales justify immediate action.

171

Id. at 422-27.
Id. at 423.
173
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
174
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423. Certain fact patterns justify court approval
of sale proposals outside of confirmation plans. The Gulf Coast Oil court provided one
such example in which the sale of an offshore oil-and-gas-production company’s assets
172
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courts should be more hesitant to approve § 363 sales since efficiency
should trump the Chapter 11 safeguards only when a decline in the
asset’s value threatens a company’s ability to emerge from bankruptcy
successfully. For instance, the Second Circuit in In re Chrysler reasoned
that Chrysler exemplified this “melting ice cube” archetype because
“its revenues [were] sinking, its factories [were] dark, and its massive
175
debts [were] growing.”
The second factor—the business justification—embodies Lionel’s
sound business purpose test in that a debtor’s pursuit of the sale of all
or substantially all of its assets must establish a valid business justification for entering into the transaction outside of a reorganization
176
plan.
The ninth factor, which considers how burdensome it would
be to effectuate the proposed sale as an element of confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan, serves as a filter, allowing debtors to use § 363 sales
only where they will be most efficient. The court distinguished between
cases involving mega-companies, in which the cost and scope of the
provision of disclosure statements and confirmation of a plan would be
quite sizeable, and smaller businesses that would face much lower reor177
In cases where the delay resulting from confirmaganization costs.
tion of a plan is similar to the delay resulting from court approval of a
§ 363 sale, “there is no apparent reason why it is more appropriate to
apply equitable powers aggressively to facilitate a § 363(b) sale than it is
appropriate to apply equitable powers aggressively to let creditors vote
178
on that proposal.” Thus, the Gulf Coast Oil court prioritizes safeguards
provided under Chapter 11 unless the debtor establishes that a § 363
179
sale will indeed prove to be the quicker and less costly option.
b. Creditor Protection and the Good Faith Requirement
The following factors are aimed at reconciling the tension between the efficiency of § 363 sales and the lack of safeguards, including disclosure and confirmation, in the § 363 sale process. The third

was necessary to prevent a decline in value that was inevitable due to the approaching
hurricane season. Id.
175
In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom.
Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
176
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423.
177
See id. at 424-25 (comparing the “burdensome and expensive” process for cases
such as Enron and Lehman Brothers to other “smaller and simpler” cases).
178
Id. at 425.
179
Id. at 426 (“The party proposing a § 363(b) sale . . . should be prepared to
prove, not merely recite, that a § 363(b) sale is quicker and less expensive.”).
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factor incorporates a creditor-protection requirement into the court’s
analysis by framing the issue not only in terms of “the amount of
180
elapsed time since the filing,” but also as a means of detecting
181
whether adequate notice has been provided to all interested parties.
As previously discussed, under § 363, creditors and investors lose leverage in negotiating the terms of in-plan liquidations as debtors circumvent the disclosure statements required in the reorganization
182
process. As a matter of due process, the Gulf Coast Oil court found it
critical to provide these parties with enough time to receive notice,
organize their claims and, if desired, participate in defending their in183
terests in the face of these proposals. For this reason, judges are encouraged to confirm that all parties, not just those who benefit from
184
the purchase of the assets, are informed and have time to understand how the sale, if approved, would affect their rights. Assurance
that the parties possessed the time to receive information regarding
the sale may assuage concerns of unfair dealing by giving parties the
opportunity to object to the good faith of the debtor and purchaser
prior to the closing of the deal.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth factors directly address the issue of
good faith in the bankruptcy context, directing the courts to engage
in an inquiry specifically related to past instances of abuse. Considerations of whether the proposed purchase agreement facilitates competing bids or whether the assets in question have been actively mar185
keted indicate whether these sales are arm’s-length transactions.
According to the court’s reasoning, the existence of only one interest186
ed purchaser may be a sign of collusion or insider dealing. In noting that “the proponents of § 363 sales argue that competitive markets
180

In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071.
See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423 (noting that “when assets are sold immediately after the case is filed,” the court may worry whether “all parties in interest have
adequately organized” and “received adequate notice”).
182
See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussing differences and advantages gained by circumventing disclosure and equity requirements for reorganization
plans).
183
See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423 (“It takes time for . . . creditors and equity interests to organize and to engage counsel, . . . to hire financial or other experts . . . , for government regulatory agencies to mobilize . . . and for other creditors
and parties in interest to determine whether (and how) to participate in the case.”).
184
See id. at 423-24 (“Proposals for quick sales, understood only by a few parties
who would benefit from the sale, are inherently suspect.”).
185
See id. at 424 (“The principal justification for § 363(b) sales is that aggressive
marketing in an active market assures that the estate will receive maximum benefit.”).
186
See id. (“The absence of any market is problematic.”).
181
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are the assurance of bona fide sales for highest value,” the court determined that an analysis of the structure of the proposal in terms of
bidding is a significant step toward obtaining maximum value for the
187
estate. In addition, the sixth factor pointedly responds to and seeks
to avoid examples of insider transactions and sweetheart deals exem188
Through acknowledgement of manageplified in Abbotts Dairies.
ment’s fiduciary duties, both as managers of a business and as debtorsin-possession, the court explicitly integrated the disinterest of these
parties as an aspect to consider when assessing a debtor’s business
189
judgment. The connection between the debtor and the purchaser is
a significant consideration in protecting both the debtor’s estate and
creditors from being taken advantage of by inadequate purchase prices.
Moreover, the eighth factor questions the extent to which purchasers of assets may benefit from protections against successor liability under Chapter 11. Although “[t]he Bankruptcy Code seems to
treat negotiation and acceptance . . . of a chapter 11 plan as the quid
pro quo for extraordinary bankruptcy benefits,” the court made it clear
that purchasers do not necessarily have the same rights outside of
190
plans that enfranchised creditors confirm. Again, the court was seemingly concerned with protecting creditors who do not possess the opportunity to play a significant role in negotiations or voting on plans.
The tenth factor evaluates which parties will benefit from a § 363
sale and ingrains the principle that “bankruptcy is, at its essence, a collective remedy intended to benefit all creditors, not just the secured
191
lender.”
The equal treatment of creditors should not be distorted
by permitting one or a few select parties to profit from the purchase of
the debtor’s assets to the detriment of other parties. Furthermore,
judicial investigation into the entities that will benefit from these sales
will deter purchasers who behave in bad faith. The eleventh factor
gives judges the power to act in their discretion by adopting protective
measures where necessary and supplements those safeguards available
192
through the reorganization process.
187

Id.
See text accompanying supra notes 141-48 (outlining the problematic deal
present in Abbotts Dairies).
189
See In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 424 (“If entities that control the debtor will
benefit, or will potentially benefit, from the sale the court must carefully consider
whether it is also appropriate to defer to their business judgment.”).
190
Id.
191
Id. at 426.
192
See id. at 427 (allowing the bankruptcy court to “consider fashioning appropriate” remedies).
188
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c. Preservation of the Integrity of the Bankruptcy Process
Several factors the Gulf Coast Oil court considered are arguably intended to ensure that distressed companies and other interested parties do not manipulate the Code in ways that Congress did not anticipate. The seventh factor, which questions whether an asset sale will
193
include all of a company’s assets or its most valuable assets, seeks to
further the original purpose of § 363—to liquidate assets like equipment to fund a successful reorganization plan. Although the court
did not prohibit sales of companies in their entirety or sales of a busi194
ness’s most valuable asset, this factor is salient in discouraging sales
that extend beyond the legitimate scope of corporate reorganizations
and congressional intent.
The twelfth factor addresses the “integrity of the bankruptcy
process” and urges judges to examine the interests at stake more extensively to avoid authorizing a sale that jeopardizes those interests or
contravenes the statutory provisions or fundamental goals of bank195
ruptcy law. The last factor ultimately grants judges the discretion to
give different weight to these considerations or to take account of
other aspects of a case in determining whether to authorize a sale pur196
suant to § 363.
3. Application of the Gulf Coast Oil Framework
After articulating these factors and expressing the notion that the
circumstances surrounding each case are “unique,” the Gulf Coast Oil
court proceeded to apply these considerations to Gulf Coast Oil’s pro197
posal. The court denied the debtor’s motion to sell all of its assets to
Laurus on the grounds that the debtors had failed to demonstrate a
good business reason for the need to sell the company prior to a plan

193

See id. at 424 (“Does the proposed sale include all of a debtor’s assets and does
it include the ‘crown jewel’?”).
194
See id. (noting that neither kind of sale is “per se prohibited”).
195
See id. at 427 (describing the judge’s interest in the result of the hearing as striving to “satisfy public expectations concerning the competence of ‘judicial supervision’
of the reorganization process”).
196
See id. at 427-28 (“There may be other factors that tip the balance or that overweigh the evaluative factors set forth above.”). Notably, this factor indicates that this
list of considerations is not exhaustive, similar to the list of relevant factors enumerated
in Lionel. See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722
F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (listing factors that courts may consider but cautioning
that “[t]his list is not intended to be exclusive”).
197
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 427-28.
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198

confirmation. Considering the “the need for speed” and the question
of “who will benefit from the sale,” the debtor’s proposal lacked evidence of deterioration of the affiliates’ assets or justification for using
§ 363 to pursue the sale of the debtor’s business to its single secured
199
lender. Thus, no basis for approving a sale outside of a plan existed
where the same benefits of using § 363 as a vehicle to preserve the
going concern value of Gulf Coast Oil’s operations could be reached
200
under § 1123 in compliance with the conditions of confirmation.
In essence, the court’s rationale in denying the debtors’ motion
reflected its prior recognition that the procedural burdens of propos201
ing the sale as part of a reorganization plan do not exist in all cases.
As here, where § 363 provided no advantage, courts should hesitate to
allow debtors to sidestep creditor safeguards such as negotiation and
voting—procedural protections that are clearly important in promoting the equal treatment of creditors under the Code. Moreover, in
light of its concern over whether the sale of all of a debtor’s
assets outside of a confirmation plan falls within the scope of Chapter
11, the court was cautious in authorizing a sale of all of Gulf Coast
Oil’s assets, especially where “there is not an active market that assures
202
In effect, the conclusion not to authorize the sale of
a fair price.”
Gulf Coast Oil prior to a reorganization plan serves as a word of caution to all bankruptcy courts. Weighing these factors should encourage judges to examine the underlying transaction more extensively,
above and beyond the proffered business justification, as a means of
upholding the integrity of and purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code.
B. Sound Business Purpose Test with Bite
The evolving nature of § 363 deals and recent criticism of these
preplan sales, which are perhaps more appropriately referred to as
“sale restructurings,” call for a revision of the legal standard applied to
198

Id. at 427-28.
Id. at 426-28. The Gulf Coast Oil court found the debtors’ argument that use of
§ 363(b) or § 1123 would not affect the outcome of the disposition irrelevant and insufficient as a business justification. Id. at 428. The legal standard does not ask whether
“an expedited plan process would . . . achieve the same result,” but rather whether a
business justification exists for permitting court approval of an asset sale outside of the
disclosure and confirmation requirements called for under Congress’s scheme of
reorganization. Id. at 428.
200
Id.
201
See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (describing the court’s observation that promotion of a § 363 sale is not desirable or efficient in all cases).
202
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 428.
199
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these cases. Many bankruptcy petitions, especially those involving
plans filed by smaller businesses, do not invoke the potential for abuse
and unfair dealing that has alarmed critics, but the key weaknesses of
the current framework can be ameliorated by closer judicial scruti203
ny. Although the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of Texas did not engage in a complete overhaul of the Lionel standard and
the sub rosa doctrine (courts must still consider factors like “the need
for speed” and the value of the assets to be purchased), it did integrate several new factors into the analysis in order to direct judicial attention to the evident changes in the use of § 363 that have developed
since the Second Circuit set forth its seminal decision in 1983. The
Gulf Coast Oil court recognized the need to set limitations on the use
of § 363 in an effort to ensure that financially distressed companies
and judges do not stray too far from congressional intent. The comprehensive set of guidelines presented in Gulf Coast Oil accomplishes
this closer scrutiny without altering the essence of the sound business
purpose test, namely a broad authorization of judicial discretion to
balance the competing interests that serve as the foundation for modern bankruptcy law. Furthermore, the main focus of the additional
factors set forth by the court fall neatly within the margins of the Code
and related case law. Most importantly, by incorporating a good faith
requirement, this inquiry will be more effective in distinguishing permissible § 363 sales from those that open the bankruptcy process to
potential abuse under the Lionel sound business purpose test.
The standard prescribed in Gulf Coast Oil maintains the basic balancing test structure employed under Lionel’s sound business purpose test, which was designed to confer on judges the flexibility to address the tension between efficiency and creditor protection in a
variety of circumstances. The interplay of the advantages and drawbacks of exercising either alternative, whether it is a sale under § 363
or § 1123, is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.
As previously discussed, the statutory language, legislative history, and
policy underlying § 363 create the need for courts to find a balance
between appropriate standards and giving judges free rein over what
204
Liberal standards and case-by-case assesssales shall be authorized.
ments are common throughout a wide range of bankruptcy issues be203

Critics like Rose support the contention that “expanded good faith and a more
involved business justification test would safeguard § 363 sales from abuse.” Rose, supra note 3, at 283.
204
See supra subsection I.A.1 (explaining the discretion Congress granted to judges
to authorize or deny asset sales).
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cause it is generally accepted that drawing “bright-line rules [will]
constrain the equitable powers of bankruptcy judges to serve the best
205
interests of the parties in any given proceeding.”
The court in Gulf Coast Oil acknowledged this need to maintain a
balancing test by requiring bankruptcy judges to “weigh all of the facts
206
and circumstances of the case.”
Thus, this newly developed frame207
work is no more narrow than the test established in Lionel. By providing a list of non-exhaustive factors as a means of updating considerations in light of current trends, critics may argue that application
of the Gulf Coast Oil framework will result in the same “inconsistent
208
However, such a criticism distorts Contreatment by the courts.”
gress’s intent to provide judges with the power to effectuate the goals
of bankruptcy in a meaningful way. For instance, strict rules governing which assets may be sold and an enumeration of an exclusive set
of business reasons that will justify these sales will result in the hindrance of some debtors from maximizing the value of their estates in
contravention of the purpose of § 363. Furthermore, an examination
of the court’s analysis reveals that judicial discretion in these cases
may in fact serve as a powerful mechanism to counteract recent concerns. The Gulf Coast Oil framework confers upon judges the authority
209
to fashion safeguards similar to those required by in-plan sales, demonstrating that discretion may be just the tool necessary to protect
210
As bright-line rules are generally not approthe interests at stake.
priate in the bankruptcy context, the model used by the Bankruptcy
Court of the Southern District of Texas provides the best option for
encouraging judges to exercise their discretionary power more effectively. This new model will encourage bankruptcy judges to address
new considerations and inquire into the good faith of the sale as a

205

Jackson, supra note 2, at 454, 497-98.
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423.
207
See Eric English, Texas Bankruptcy Court Rejects Chapter 11 Debtors’ Request to Sell
All of Their Assets and Calls for Fifth Circuit to Clarify Legal Standard, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, May 14, 2009, available at LEXIS, 2009 EMERGING ISSUES 3629
(“[T]he opinion in In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp. demonstrates that some courts construe
section 363 and the applicable Fifth Circuit precedent rather narrowly.”).
208
Rose, supra note 3, at 250.
209
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 423.
210
See, e.g., In re On-Site Sourcing, Inc., 412 B.R. 817, 824-26 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2009) (utilizing the discretion afforded by the Gulf Coast Oil test to approve a proposed
asset sale on the condition that certain terms of the agreement, such as the release of
three key employees and a general unsecured creditors trust, were removed in order to
avoid evasion of the Chapter 11 confirmation process).
206
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means of shaping § 363 sales into transactions that balance debtor rehabilitation with creditor protection.
In conjunction with this affirmation of discretion, the Gulf Coast
Oil standard encourages more stringent scrutiny of § 363 sales from
yet another angle often overlooked by courts. In recent years, much
attention has been drawn to cases such as Mission Iowa Wind Co. v.
Enron Corp. and In re Abbotts Dairies, in which bankruptcy courts have
failed to take notice of potential insider dealing—conduct clearly
211
exemplifying bad faith under the relevant good faith paradigm.
Despite the recognition that both § 363(m) and § 1112(b) impose a
good faith obligation on both the debtor and purchaser, it is common
for opinions involving approval of § 363 sales merely cite good faith as
a component of the sound business purpose test without delving into
any such inquiry. Critics often warn that because of
vague “you know it when you see it” standards for good faith . . . and the
ability of the dominant parties to create a business justification for a
quick sale, the bankruptcy courts are being turned into the auction
houses of choice for businesses with either financial trouble or the po212
tential of liabilities that would otherwise follow their assets.

For this reason, § 363 sales have become vehicles for abuse and, as such,
courts must undertake a more stringent analysis of good faith before
approving these transactions in order to comply fully with the Code.
The framework set out in Gulf Coast Oil resolves this issue by
implying a good faith requirement within its enumerated factors.
Although the case does not expressly use the term “good faith,” several factors of the test aim to detect bad faith as it has been interpreted
within the context of § 363 sales. First, the consideration of the disinterest of the fiduciaries controlling the debtor serves to discern
213
whether a transaction is tainted by inside dealing and collusion.
Requiring the establishment of a good business reason for selling a
debtor’s assets outside of a plan of reorganization was designed to
provide a limitation on the use of § 363 sales, a constraint believed to
214
be necessary to further the purpose of the bankruptcy process.
211

See discussion supra Section I.B (highlighting the self-dealing present where
bankruptcy courts do not adequately investigate asset sales).
212
George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining
the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 272-73 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
213
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 424.
214
See Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Every sale under § 363(b) does not automatically shortcircuit or side-step Chapter 11; nor are these two statutory provisions to be read as mutually exclusive.”).
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However, deference to a business judgment provided by interested
members of management who seek to gain money, stock, or employment with the purchaser would render this limitation meaningless.
For instance, had the bankruptcy court in In re Abbotts Dairies investigated the question of whether Mr. Gwinn, the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the debtor, was truly a disinterested fiduciary, the
court would have had reason to doubt the proffered business reason
215
for the sale of the assets to ADC. Surely Mr. Gwinn’s expected employment with the debtor’s prospective purchaser would have given
the court a strong foundation to believe that collusion had occurred
between the fiduciary and ADC and that the agreement reached between the parties did not maximize the debtor’s value. Thus the court
intended this consideration to augment the vigor of the sound business purpose test.
Moreover, the questions related to the beneficiaries of the sale—
whether there has been an active market for the assets involved and if
the terms of the purchase agreement facilitate competitive bids—
attempt to discern whether the transaction has been negotiated at
216
A dissection of the court’s reasoning for characterizarm’s length.
ing these factors as significant indicates that an inquiry into the market and the potential purchaser is necessary in order to ensure both
that the estate receives the maximum value for the assets and that a
low purchase amount that benefits only the purchaser does not harm
217
creditor’s rights or the debtor’s rehabilitation.
These factors provide courts with the guidelines necessary to address recent concerns head-on because the factors incorporate direct
considerations of good faith, rather than implying that the superficial
citations of the term satisfy the requirement. Some courts do under218
take inquiries into the good faith of the debtor and purchaser, and
in these cases, one can argue that the Gulf Coast Oil considerations
reach the same outcome expressly that other courts arrive at implicit215

Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Nat’l Farmers’ Org., Inc. (In re Abbotts Dairies
of Pa., Inc.), 788 F.2d 143, 146-48 (3d Cir. 1986).
216
In re Gulf Coast Oil, 404 B.R. at 424-26.
217
See id. at 424 (“[A]ggressive marketing in an active market assures that the estate will receive maximum benefit.”).
218
See e.g., In re Chrysler LLC, 405 B.R. 84, 106-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (concluding that negotiations between Fiat and Chrysler were in good faith, that neither
the terms of the agreement nor the involvement of the government precluded competitive bidding, and that the government did not constitute an “insider” of the debtors),
aff’d, 576 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated as moot sub nom. Ind. State Police Pension
Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 130 S. Ct. 1015 (2009).
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ly. However, as shown, all too often bad faith proposals are caught on219
ly at the appellate level.
Consequently, there is a concern that unless a party objects to a sale with enough fervor, bad faith transactions
that are not in the best interests of the parties and have the ability to
tarnish the integrity of the bankruptcy process will slip through the
growing loopholes of the sound business purpose test. Where appeals
220
are often difficult to come by and such great interests are at stake,
the standard set forth in Gulf Coast Oil reaches the appropriate solution
to the current tendency of judges to bypass a good faith analysis and
creditor safeguards in favor of the debtor’s business judgment.
Furthermore, even in cases where the court investigates the good
faith of the purchaser, courts disregard the more general interpretation of good faith, that is, whether a debtor seeks to achieve a purpose
221
“outside the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws.” Although the
Lionel factors partially address this issue by contemplating the likelihood of the proposal or confirmation of a reorganization plan and
222
the effect of the sale on any future plans, case law indicates that
good faith extends beyond possession of a “valid reorganizational
223
Notably, the court in Gulf Coast Oil addressed the latest
purpose.”
concerns stimulated by the GM and Chrysler bankruptcies: questions
of good faith in the broader context of Chapter 11 and whether courts
are authorizing sales that go beyond the purpose of § 363. Factors including whether “the proposed sale include[s] all of a debtor’s assets”
and if the proposal is adverse to the integrity of the bankruptcy
224
process have the purpose of uncovering whether this use of § 363 as
a substitute for corporate restructurings is legitimately within the
scope of bankruptcy law. Although the outcome of the Chrysler bankruptcy may not have been altered by an analysis of these factors, a further investigation into the legislative history and purpose behind
§ 363 may have provided debtors, creditors, investors, judges, and lawyers insight into the boundaries of this expanding tactic. In light of
the relationship between the controversial aspects of § 363 sales and
219

See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s
review of Abbotts Dairies).
220
See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (describing the practical barriers
to appeal in such instances).
221
Marsch v. Marsch (In re Marsch), 36 F.3d 825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994).
222
Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983).
223
See supra note 130 and accompanying text (noting the factors set forth by the
Sixth Circuit for aiding courts “in determining that the debtor has filed in bad faith”).
224
In re Gulf Coast Oil Corp., 404 B.R. 407, 424-72 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
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the factors set forth by the Gulf Coast Oil court, it is evident that this
more comprehensive standard gives the sound business purpose test
the bite necessary to encourage judges to take a more critical stance in
authorizing these transactions.
CONCLUSION
While the advantages of a quick, less costly, and often more efficient sale of assets within the scope of a bankruptcy petition are manifestly undisputed, the generally accepted sound business purpose test
has grown too malleable in the hands of powerful creditors and selfinterested debtors. The need for a more stringent legal standard to
assist courts in determining whether to authorize a sale under § 363
has surfaced with new urgency in this turbulent economy. The
framework the Gulf Coast Oil court adopted provides an updated and
balanced solution to the concerns arising from the expanded use of
§ 363 as a complete restructuring tactic by emphasizing both the benefits of this provision and the constraints that should be applied to
bad faith debtors and purchasers.
The thirteen enumerated factors offer a basis on which judges
may exercise their statutory “unfettered” discretion to mold these sales
in the most efficient, yet creditor-friendly manner. Additionally, the
factors’ analysis of good faith from several perspectives—namely an
investigation into the underlying relationship between the debtor and
the purchaser, as well as a discussion of whether the transaction falls
within the legitimate scope of the bankruptcy laws—promotes principles significant throughout other aspects of the bankruptcy process.
This foundation preserves the advantages of § 363 but at the same time
recognizes the need to weigh the competing interests of debtor rehabilitation and creditor protection inherent in bankruptcy law. As a result,
Gulf Coast Oil ’s flexible, yet more focused approach allows courts to address concerns of abuse while tailoring § 363 sales to promote the underlying goals of bankruptcy. Therefore, as § 363 sales continue to
evolve, this standard should serve as the model for future courts.

